历史的弧线：奥巴马外交政策评说（4）

2009年12月，在哥本哈根举行的全球气候变化谈判搁浅，美中双方存在明显分歧，奥巴马对此的反应灵活而有新意。由于受到美国国内力量的阻挠，奥巴马没能在哥本哈根推动签署一份全面的协议，他也因此陷入困境。但他成功地推动中国、巴西、印度、南非达成了一项符合美国国内需求的“协议”，使得美国在大会上的形象相对积极，也让中国与其原本计划相去甚远。往届美国总统中，有的不善于掌控情绪，因此给中美分歧蒙上了个人色彩，可能需要经过数月甚至数年才能修复。尽管无法在国内大幅度改变能源政策，奥巴马还是做了大量工作来提高未来汽车业的长期汽油里程 要求，并要求环保部门在其他领域行使职权，这些举措都将在未来产生重要的积极作用。

俄罗斯向来善变，但即便它真的要改变主意而导致当前的局势逆转，“俄罗斯重置”政策无疑已经取得了相当成果。奥巴马主动向俄罗斯示好，并已经取得了一定成效：他弱化了（尽管没有完全放弃）对于俄罗斯人权和政治自由的批判，再次参与到正式战略军控谈判中，认同俄罗斯对于欧洲导弹防御系统计划的担心，而且没有对俄罗斯未来的导弹防御决定投反对票。欧洲导弹防御系统计划导致了《新削减战略武器条约》的签订，目的是减少美国和俄罗斯的核武库。即使现在的俄罗斯和美国仍然意见不一，另外在利比亚、叙利亚还有导弹防御等其他一系列事务上也都存在分歧，但这些分歧的声音从容缓和了许多。同时，重置政策还加紧了对伊朗的国际制裁，开放了经由俄罗斯和前苏联加盟共和国至阿富汗北部的供应路线，以减少北约对巴基斯坦的后勤依赖。

一般而言，奥巴马在个人时间的分配上一直都高度自律、主次分明。他对当前的关键问题予以头等关注，其中包括与崛起中的中国的国家关系问题，以及伊拉克、阿富汗和巴基斯坦问题；反恐和防止核扩散问题；阿拉伯觉醒以及全球经济的困境等诸多大问题。他最大程度地避免了纠结于次等重要的问题或是陷入政策的老生常谈中。例如，他并没有被卷入与委内瑞拉总统乌戈 查韦斯、或与津巴布韦总统罗伯特 穆加贝、或与缅甸的政府军之间麻烦的争端中去。他并不抱有幻想，希望他当选的简单事实会很快改善美国与这些国家领导人之间的关系，正如与伊朗和朝鲜领导人的关系一样。但是，他一直努力改善与各国的关系，就像这本书里提到的，在2012年初，美国与一些国家改善关系似乎成为可能，至少与缅甸如此，与新任领导人带领下的朝鲜同样有改善的可能。(高菲 译)

When global climate change talks in Copenhagen were foundering in December 2009, most visibly over differences between the United States and China, Obama responded flexibly and creatively. Caught in the difficult position of being unable to push for a comprehensive agreement at Copenhagen because of his inability to overcome his own domestic constraints, Obama successfully engaged China, Brazil, India, and South Africa to produce an “accord” that delivered what he needed domestically, put the United States in a relatively positive light at the conference, and brought the Chinese farther along than they had planned. Presidents less in control of their emotions might have personalized the U.S.-China disagreement in a way that would have taken months or years to mend. Although unable to make big changes at home on energy policy, Obama did substantially toughen longer-term gas mileage requirements for future automobiles and used the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority in other areas, steps that will yield important benefits down the road.

The “Russia reset” policy, even if always subject to reversal given Moscow’s mercurial nature, has clearly yielded dividends. Obama’s willingness to reach out to Russia—lightening (though not abandoning) the criticism on human rights and political freedoms, reengaging in formal strategic arms control talks, and acknowledging Russia’s concerns about a planned missile defense system in Europe, without going so far as to give Moscow a veto over future missile defense decisions—has worked to a degree. It produced the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to reduce the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Even when Russia and the United States disagree these days, as they do over Libya and Syria and other matters—including missile defense—the tone of disagreement is more subdued and contained. Meanwhile, the reset policy has made a significant difference in tightening international sanctions on Iran and in opening up northern supply routes through Russia and former Soviet republics into Afghanistan to lessen NATO’s logistical dependence on Pakistan.

Generally speaking, President Obama has remained disciplined and prioritized his own use of time. He has given top attention to the key issues of the day—not only the rise of China but Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation; the Arab awakenings; and the woes of the global economy. He has for the most part avoided getting bogged down in secondary matters or policy ruts. For example, he was not lured into counterproductive spats with President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, or the junta that ran Burma. He harbored no illusions that the simple fact of his election would quickly turn around America’s relationships with such tyrants, any more than with the leaders of Iran and North Korea. Yet he has kept the door to improve relations open enough that, as of this writing in early 2012, progress appears possible, at least with Burma and perhaps with North Korea under its new leadership.